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Abstract
We compare behavior in Weber￿ s (2001) Dirty Faces Game with
that in a modi￿ed version. The modi￿ed version is designed to re-
duce the level of strategic uncertainty by ruling out some equilibria in
weakly dominated strategies. We ￿nd that in the three-player version
of the game reduced strategic uncertainty leads to increased agreement
with equilibrium in situations where common knowledge of rationality
is required. We conclude that a considerable fraction of deviation from
equilibrium is caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality.
We don￿ t ￿nd this e⁄ect in the two-player version of the game.
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Roberto Weber (2001) reports in this journal on a laboratory Dirty Faces
Game, which he uses to study individuals￿iteration ability and learning.
One of the study￿ s main ￿ndings is that individuals are rarely conforming to
equilibrium (as de￿ned there) if more than one step of iteration is required.
This paper revisits the Dirty Faces Problem and investigates why the shown
iteration ability is so poor. In what follows we argue that not only the itera-
tion ability of individuals but also their beliefs about the level of rationality
of others play a crucial role. For this purpose we show that in Roberto
Webers setup individuals are required to rely on other individuals not to
pursue weakly dominated (equilibrium) strategies. Then we modify Weber￿ s
game in such a way that relying on the other players obeying strict domin-
ance is su¢ cient and exploit di⁄erences in play across the two environments
to make out point.
We ￿nd that this modi￿cation increases the occurrence of equilibrium
play in complex situations (3 players), where subjects need to rely on other
subjects￿ability to perform at least one step of iteration. In situations,
where beliefs can be formed without relying on the rationality of others,
agreement of play with equilibrium remains the same. We conjecture that in
the three-player Dirty Faces Game a considerable amount of deviation from
equilibrium is due to the lack of common knowledge of rationality, since the
reduction of strategic uncertainty in the modi￿ed game increases agreement
with equilibrium play. Thus, using behavior in this game as a measure for
iteration ability underestimates humans￿ability. In a simpler environment (2
players) there is no signi￿cant di⁄erences in play for the two versions of the
game. We do not ￿nd evidence for the confound of lack of iterative ability
and common knowledge of rationality in the two-player game.
2 The Dirty Faces Game
In the dirty faces game (Littlewood 1953) individuals have to ￿gure out their
type (a dirty or clean face) from the observation of the types and behavior
of other players. Additionally, players can rely on an announcement of a
referee detailing if there is at least on player of a certain type.1 A player in
such a situation can deduce her type in a ￿nite number of iteration steps if
(a) she is rational and omniscient and if (b) she knows that all other players
are also rational and omniscient. Weber (2001) transformed the puzzle into
1See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Myerson (1991) for precise and detailed treat-
ments of the problem.
2a Bayesian Game with the objective to compare ideal behavior with actual
behavior in the lab. In what follows we describe Weber￿ s game and show
that individuals need to rely on other players avoiding weakly dominated
strategies. We then propose a slight variation of the game, where relying on
others obeying to strict dominance is su¢ cient.
2.1 Weber￿ s implementation
First we present Roberto Weber￿ s game for two players2. Suppose there are
two players who can be of type X or O: The prior probability for a player
being of type X is given by p: Player i knows player j0s type ￿j but not her
own type ￿i: Denote the probability with which player i believes to be of type
X as ￿i: The timing of the game is as follows:
1. A referee announces if there is at least one player of type X or not. Let
I 2 f0;1g be an indicator, which is equal to 1 if there is at least one
player of type X:
2. Players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose an action a1
i 2 fUp;Downg;
i 2 f1;2g: If at least one player chooses Down the game ends.
3. Otherwise both players learn the previous action of the other player
and then simultaneously choose again a2
i 2 fUp;Downg; i 2 f1;2g:
After that the game ends and the payo⁄s are realized.
The payo⁄s are contingent on the action taken and on the type of a player.
Playing Up yields a payo⁄of zero regardless of the type, while playing Down
yields a pro￿t ￿ if the own type is X and a loss of ￿ if the type is O: The






2We later will also consider a three player version, where the iterative logic analogous.
3Consequently, a player who is certain about her type has a preferred
action ￿Up if the type is O and Down if her type is X: The parameters are
chosen such that playing Down does not pay for a player (say i), who is not
risk-loving and holds the prior belief ￿i = p. We require p￿ < (1 ￿ p)￿: It is
easy to show that there exists a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium with the






O O Up;Up Up;Up
X O Down;￿ Up;￿
O X Up;￿ Down;￿
X X Up;Down Up;Down
Table 2: Equilibrium play for two players
If both players are of type O the referee announces that there is no player
with type X. This allows the players to update (i.e. ￿1 = ￿2 = 0), which
leads to the optimal continuation of both players playing Up in the ￿rst
round. The play proceeds to the next round without any further update and
both players play Up again.
If one player is of type X and observes the other player being of type O
then the referee announces I = 1: As the player (say i) of type X observes
the other player￿ s type, which is O, she can update to ￿i = 1 (she knows that
she is of type X) and an optimal continuation is playing Down. The other
player observes this player being of type X; which means that I = 1 does not
lead to any updating (￿j = p). Then the individually rational continuation
is playing Up:
Now suppose that both players are of type X: For both players the ref-
eree￿ s announcement I = 1 does not lead to updating as both observe an
other player of type X: Consequently, the individually rational continuation
is to play Up for both. Given the behavior outlined above for a type con￿gur-
ation XO players can update after this period. The fact that the other player
did not play Down rules out the type pro￿les XO and OX; respectively. It
follows ￿1 = ￿2 = 1, which then leads to Down being individually rational
for both players. Note that this updating process depends on a player rely-
ing on the other player ending the game immediately after ￿guring out her
type (i.e. player 1 playing Down immediately if (￿1;￿2) = (X;O)). Roberto
Weber only considers this equilibrium in his analysis.
4Now suppose player 1 does not play Down immediately for I = 1 and ￿2 =
O: For player 2 as a ￿rst choice, action a1
2 = Up is still uniquely individually
rational. Consequently, the game will go on to the second decision stage,
where player 1 can still play Down and earn ￿, which is the same payo⁄
as if she chose Down right away. This shows that there exist some other
equilibria where a player delays ending the game by playing Up even if ￿ = 1:
In all these equilibria perfect updating in the case of (￿1;￿2) = (X;X) is
not possible anymore.3 These additional Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria
all have the property that they do not survive the re￿nement of sequential
equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982), as delaying playing Down is a weakly
dominated strategy.
2.2 The modi￿ed Dirty Faces Game
It is easy to modify the game such that the equilibria that contain weekly
dominated strategies vanish. Discounting the payo⁄s is our preferred choice.
Again consider the two-player version of the game. We leave the timing
unchanged but discount the payo⁄s if the game is ended with the second
choice. Table 3 shows the payo⁄s of the modi￿ed game, where t is the period




i = Up 0 0
at
i = Down ￿
t￿1￿ ￿￿
t￿1￿
Table 3: Discounted payo⁄s
In this modi￿ed game for player 1 delaying playing Down in case of a
type pro￿le (￿1;￿2) = (X;O) is not only weakly but strictly dominated. The
equilibria where a player delays playing Down if she is certain to be of type
X disappear. The strategies outlined in Table 2 constitute the unique Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in this modi￿ed game.
3Note that a player, who has learned her type, could also play a mixed strategy and
randomize over the ￿rst choice if XO is observed.
52.3 Equilibria for three players
The same iterative logic applies for games with more than two players. Now
the maximum number of decision stages (if no one has played Down before) is
increased to n, the number of players. For I = 1 a player who only sees type
O players can update that she must be of type X: Then in an equilibrium
where players do not delay ending the game, a player observing only one
other player of type X can infer her type from this players ￿rst choice. If
the sole type X player she sees plays Up she can infer that she must be of
type X; as the other player would have played Down if he had not seen an
other type X player. A player, who is seeing two other players of type X;
can infer from these two players playing Up twice in a row that they must
have seen another type X, which is hers. Playing Down in the third round is
sequentially rational. For I = 1 a player can infer her type (in equilibrium)
by using k +1 steps of iteration, where k is the number of players of type X
she observes.










O O O Up;Up;Up Up;Up;Up Up;Up;Up
X O O Down;￿;￿ Up;￿;￿ Up;￿;￿
X X O Up;Down;￿ Up;Down;￿ Up;Up;￿
X X X Up;Up;Down Up;Up;Down Up;Up;Down
Table 4: Equilibrium play for three players
Table 4 shows the equilibrium play for three players, where strategically
equivalent type patterns are omitted for brevity. As in the case of two players,
Weber￿ s undiscounted dirty faces game has some other equilibria (, which are
not sequential), while in the discounted game this equilibrium is unique.
2.4 Comparing play in the two versions of the Dirty
Faces Game
Comparing actual play in the two versions of the Dirty Faces Game can
provide interesting insights into individuals reasoning processes. The game
has been used to investigate how many steps of reasoning individuals can
do. However, the interactive nature of the game prevents a clean separation
of limited iteration ability from strategic uncertainty as a reason for the
failure to play equilibrium strategies. A player who is able to perform the
6iteration steps necessary has to rely on the rationality of the other player(s),
when two or more iteration steps are required. Failure to play according to
the equilibrium prediction can be the consequence of either limited iteration
ability or limited trust in the iteration ability of the other player(s).
The original game has (beside some others) the same plausible equilib-
rium as the discounted game. By looking at type patterns where only one
step of iteration is necessary we can ￿nd out how many people are willing
to obey week dominance. Suppose we do not ￿nd any di⁄erences across the
discounted and non-discounted game for one step of iteration. Then we can
conclude that people are actually not willing to play the equilibria in weakly
dominated strategies in Weber￿ s original game. Comparing the frequencies of
play according to the natural equilibrium for more complex situations where
players have to rely on the rationality of others becomes interesting. Dif-
ferent equilibrium frequencies in the discounted versus non-discounted Dirty
Faces Game document that eliminating the equilibria in weakly dominated
strategies changes the beliefs of players about the rationality of others. It
also shows that not only iterative ability but also strategic uncertainty is
contributing to deviation from equilibrium play. Consequently, if di⁄erent
equilibrium frequencies for more iteration steps than one are observed, one
can conclude that using the play in interactive Dirty Faces Games to measure
iteration depth in humans underestimates the actual ability. Some deviations
stemming from strategic uncertainty are wrongly attributed to limited iter-
ation ability.
3 Experimental design and results
We replicated the experiments of Weber (2001) with our subject pool and
compared the results to an otherwise identical discounted Dirty Faces Game.
Over all 135 subjects participated in the four treatments (discounted and
non-discounted payo⁄s with two or three players). The experiments were
conducted at the Adelaide Laboratory for Experimental Economics. We
used the payo⁄parameters ￿ = 100 and ￿ = 400: The discount factor for the
discounted game was set to ￿ = 0:8; while the prior probability of being of
type X was p = 2=3: Experimental payo⁄s where converted into Australian
Dollars with an exchange rate of one AUD for 100 Experimental Currency
Units (ECU). Subjects where given 900 ECU as an endowment. Subjects
played 14 Dirty faces games in a partner design and earned about AUD 9.5
for 40 minutes of their time.
73.1 Results
In what follows we present the main results. Tables 5 and 6 report the pro-
portion of observations that are in agreement with the sequential equilibrium
(, which is the unique equilibrium in the discounted game) depending on the
iteration depth required. We removed the observations, where a player was
still on the equilibrium path, but the game ended prematurely because of a
mistake of an other player in the group. In those cases we cannot decide if
the player would have stayed on the equilibrium path until the end. Note
that the number of iteration steps necessary is determined by the realized
pattern of types. Zero steps represents the situation where all players are of
type O; which leads to an announcement that no player is of type O: One
iteration step is required if a player sees no other player of type X but knows
that there is at least one player of type X: There is no strategic uncertainty
as a player does not need to rely on the rationality of others in order to secure
the positive payo⁄ of 100. If a player sees one or two other players of type
X strategic uncertainty comes into play and two or three steps of iteration
are necessary to adhere to equilibrium play ￿additionally to the trust in the
rationality of the other player(s).
discounted 0 steps 1 step 2 steps
yes 94:6(74) 94:3(123) 56:4(337)
no 86:1(36) 94:7(76) 60:4(197)
p(yes) 6= p(no) no (p > :12) no (p > :89) no (p > :36)
Table 5: Equilibrium play by treatment and iteration steps required, n = 2
In the two-player game we observe that introducing discounting and re-
moving some strategic uncertainty does not have an in￿ uence on the propor-
tion of subjects playing according to the (sequential) equilibrium. Tests of
proportions cannot reject the null hypothesis that the proportions are equal
for any iteration depth.
The picture is fundamentally di⁄erent for the three-player game. For 2
and 3 steps of iteration the sequential equilibrium is signi￿cantly more often
played in the discounted game. The fraction of equilibrium agreement is
almost four times higher in the discounted game. This observation alone is
8discounted 0 steps 1 step 2 steps 3 steps
yes 83:3(24) 91:7(48) 39:7(224) 19:1(178)
no 72:2(18) 86:7(15) 10:6(94) 5:3(76)
p(yes)6= p(no) no (p > :38) no (p > :56) yes (p < :01) yes (p < :01)
Table 6: Equilibrium play by treatment and iteration steps required, n = 3
not very surprising, as in the undiscounted game some other equilibria exist.
However, in situations with iteration depth 1, where strategic uncertainty
does not play any role in the sequential equilibrium, we do not observe sig-
ni￿cantly more equilibrium play in the discounted game. This indicates that
about the same fraction in both treatments are willing and able to follow
the sequential equilibrium. Therefore, the di⁄erence in situations with depth
2 and 3 cannot be explained by subjects playing equilibria other than the
sequential equilibrium in the undiscounted game. Consequently, the di⁄er-
ence has to be explained by di⁄erent beliefs about the reliability of other
players ending the game immediately after deducing that their type is X:
Subjects are more con￿dent that others will end the game immediately once
they know their type if this is a strictly dominant strategy, which is the case
in the discounted game.4
The ￿ndings above are evidence for strategic uncertainty playing an im-
portant role in the three-player game, while in the two player game the drop
in the proportion of equilibrium play between one and two steps of iteration
required can be attributed to limited depth of iteration. This is consistent
with the observation that the fraction of subjects adhering to equilibrium
play for two steps is greater in the two-player version of the game (p < :01;
test of proportions, for both versions of the game).5 We conclude that using
the fraction of equilibrium agreement for the di⁄erent iteration depths as a
measure for the distribution of iterative ability in humans underestimates
the actual capabilities in the three player game.
4The results from above are con￿rmed by a panel data analysis allowing for random
e⁄ects on the subject level and by a mixed-level estimation additionally allowing for group
random e⁄ects. The results can be obtained from the author￿ s web site.
5The proportion of equilibrium play in the two-player game for one and two steps of
iteration is roughly consistent with the results for the three player game in Bayer and
Renou (2008), where all strategic uncertainty is removed.
94 Conclusion
In this paper we replicate Roberto Weber￿ s Dirty Faces experiments and
compare play to that in a modi￿ed game. In the modi￿ed game some strategic
uncertainty is removed, as there equilibrium play does not require subjects
to rely on other subjects adhering to weak dominance. We ￿nd that in
the three-player version subjects exhibit equilibrium play more often in the
game with less strategic uncertainty, when they have to rely on the rationality
of others. This indicates that in the three-person Dirty Faces Game some
deviation from equilibrium play is due to the lack of common knowledge of
rationality. Using behavior in experimental three-player Dirty Faces Games
as a measure for human iteration ability underestimates the iteration ability.
In the two-player Dirty Faces Game removing some strategic uncertainty
does not improve agreement with equilibrium. This suggests that measuring
human iteration ability with a two-player Dirty Faces Game does not su⁄er
from the described problem of confound.
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